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Abstract 
 
The experimental literature has shown the tendency for experimental trading markets to 
converge to neoclassical predictions. Yet, the extent to which theory explains the 
equilibrating forces in markets remains under-researched, especially in the developing world. 
We set up a laboratory in 94 villages in rural Sierra Leone to mimic a real market. In this 
laboratory market, average efficiency of the within-village treatment is somewhat lower than 
predicted by theory (and observed in different contexts), and markets do not fully converge to 
theoretical predictions across rounds of trading. We also find that trading with strangers 
reduces efficiency, and that anonymized trade within the village does not affect efficiency. 
This points to the importance of behavioral norms for trade. Intra-village social relationships 
or hierarchies, instead, appear less important as determinants of trade. This is confirmed by 
analysis of the trader-level data, showing that individual earnings in the experiment do not 
vary with one’s status or position in local networks. 
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1. Introduction 
A central tenet of neoclassical economics is that in equilibrium there are no 
unexploited gains to trade. The workhorse model within economics implies that in a perfectly 
competitive market, the first function of the equilibrium price is to efficiently allocate scarce 
resources to market participants. This principle, embodied in Adam Smith’s invisible hand 
metaphor, represents the backbone of the measurement of the gains to trade, provides 
guidance into optimal tax policy, and embodies why market-based interventions are often 
proposed as a key element of policy reform agendas for developing countries. The theoretical 
consistency of the efficient outcome of market allocations has been substantiated through 
experimental studies conducted in a developed world social context (Smith 1962, Roth 1995, 
Holt 1995, List 2002, 2004).  
We explore the limits of the applicability of this theoretical prediction for rural 
inhabitants in developing countries, and test whether outcomes in market-trading games 
remain efficient when participants originate from communities with little exposure to 
markets. In addition, participants in our sample are more socially connected than most market 
experimental studies which typically include college students. Specifically, we report on a 
double-sided decentralized oral auction that was run as a lab-in-the-field experiment in 94 
villages in Eastern Sierra Leone. Our subjects live in areas that are between 2 to 6 hours walk 
away from market towns. Market trading in these areas occurs at low volumes and over a 
small range of products. On average, only 43 percent of our subjects reported to buy or sell 
something more than once a week.
1
 Most are subsistence farmers with, most of the time, 
hardly any cash to spend at a market. Indeed, 12 percent of our subjects reports that they 
never go to markets.   
                                                 
1
 Typically, food crops (cassava, rice, beans), cash crops (palm oil, cocoa, coffee), animals (fish, bush meat) are 
brought to the markets and imported essentials, such as salt, sugar, and soap, are brought back to the villages. 
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Our approach enables us to consider whether exchange patterns are driven by forces 
other than profit motives. Rural life in Africa is to an important extent governed by social 
norms (linked to social status, kinship norms, social ties etc.) and institutions that are distinct 
from those (implicitly) assumed in neoclassical economics. This might matter for the 
efficiency of markets. Granovetter (2005, p.38), for example, argues that the impact of social 
relations on trading prices may vary with the nature of the relationship, the cost of shifting to 
other partners, and the market situation: “The theoretical issue is often not one of economic 
and sociological arguments conflicting, but rather of the weakness of both in understanding 
how actors with simultaneous economic and non-economic motives will act.” 
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we explore the efficiency of market 
behavior by conducting intra- and inter village trading experiments with subjects from one of 
the poorest regions in the world. Second, we intend to make a methodological contribution 
and probe whether social dimensions are a potential impediment to trade, interfering with the 
workings of the invisible hand.
2
 We try to distinguish between behavioral norms associated 
with exchange behavior within the village, and person-specific social relations – one’s 
position in local networks or hierarchies. For example, we ask whether status and social 
relationships (patron-client networks, kinship relations, or trust-based relations) interact with 
market structures to cause inefficient trading behavior. While most experimental papers on 
status and efficiency are based on status randomly induced within the experiment (e.g., Ball 
et al. 2001, Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003, Frey and Meier 2004, Kumru and Vesterlund 
2010)
3
, we use subjects who are socially connected in real life and take advantage of the 
existing, endogenously formed status hierarchies in their community. In our set up, we 
                                                 
2
 Previous studies in Western societies indicate that social distance and the degree of anonymity affects play in 
dictator and ultimatum games (e.g., Hoffman et al. 1996, Bohnet and Frey 1999, Charness and Gneezy 2008). 
Baldassari and Grossman (2013) focus on the effects of group attachment and social position on prosocial 
behavior (measured via dictator games) in Uganda. 
3
 See Chandrasekhar et al. (2013) for an example of the use of real-life social networks in a field experiment. 
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experimentally vary the social distance between buyers and sellers, as well as the trading 
technology and the anonymity of partners trading. 
We report three key insights. First, earlier experimental findings reported in Smith 
(1962) and List (2002, 2004) do not fully extend to our environment. Specifically, when 
using a conventional double auction setting, overall efficiency levels are lower than 
previously observed, and aggregate behavior across trading rounds in experimental markets 
does not seem to fully converge towards theoretical predictions of efficiency.  
Second, we find that there exists a social dimension to trade, and speculate that norms 
about intra-village behavior affect economic efficiency. While one’s own position in local 
hierarchies does not explain profits from trade, we observe that trading efficiency is higher in 
samples drawn from the same social network than in samples where trading partners are 
strangers. Eliminating face-to-face interaction from the within-village treatment, or making 
within-village trade anonymous, does not matter for efficiency, but affects the number of 
trades and the distribution of the surplus.  
Third, based on analyses of trader behavior and realized trades in the experiment, we 
find that some observable personal characteristics affect market outcomes. For instance, 
literate people are more likely to trade. We also find that men and younger agents earn higher 
profits in the experiment than women or older participants. Status and one’s position in local 
networks or hierarchies, instead, does not matter for experimental earnings. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical background and 
introduces conceptual foundations. In section 3 we explain the experimental design and 
develop a series of exploratory hypotheses. In section 4 we analyze the aggregate data, 
focusing on efficiency levels and differences across experimental treatments. In section 5 we 
consider how individual characteristics drive results. Conclusions and discussion of our 
results ensue in section 6.  
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2. Conceptual Foundations 
Our experiment speaks to various literatures. First, given our sample of subsistence 
farmers with very little trading experience, the results speak to the literature on the transition 
from personalized exchange to anonymous trade (see also Fafchamps 2011, Kimbrough et al. 
2008). This issue is not merely a theoretical nicety. For example, the dominant agricultural 
development paradigm in current policy circles is to enhance the efficient operation of 
markets and to link producers (and consumers) to regional or international markets and value 
chains (Byerlee et al. 2009). However, according to some theories, there are 
complementarities in exchange modalities, which imply that such a transition might not 
easily occur. If most villagers opt for one exchange modality, network externalities cause 
others to follow regardless of whether this modality is “globally efficient.” In communities 
where all potential trading partners adopt one trading technology (say, trading based on 
reputation and trust), then it is in the interest of newcomers to also invest in this technology, 
even if net welfare gains would occur if all villagers could somehow coordinate on the 
simultaneous switch to another more superior technology (say, based on external enforcement 
of contracts via arbitrators and courts). Hence, there are theoretical reasons to suspect that 
communities may end up caught in an institutionally-induced poverty trap (Kranton 1996, 
Kumar and Matsusaka 2009).  
Our experiment also extends the body of experimental literature that spawned from 
the seminal work of Smith (1962) and that has provided robust laboratory evidence that 
market outcomes tend to approach neoclassical expectations. List (2002, 2004) moved the 
analysis from the laboratory to the field by organizing a field experiment wherein real-world 
market participants engaged in face-to-face bilateral bargaining (market transactions) in a 
more natural setting. A key result was the strong tendency for exchange prices to approach 
the neoclassical competitive model predictions, especially in symmetric markets. But does 
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this result extend to a context characterized by personalized exchange and non-economic (i.e. 
social) trade motives? Analysts of tribal economies and peasant markets argue that trading is 
typically characterized by “clientalization” and restricted to “designated others in foreign 
groups” (e.g., Sahlin 1972) resulting in prices that deviate from competitive levels (Davis 
1973). Our analysis allows us to probe whether social factors matter for trading efficiency. 
Finally, while it is useful to establish that social dimensions might interfere with 
market efficiency, it is clearly more useful to know which social dimensions matter (most). 
Villages in rural Sierra Leone are socially stratified, based on ranked-based (family) lineages. 
They typically contain elites, landowning families, the descendants of slaves, and “strangers” 
(often descendants of people who moved into the village generations ago). The latter two 
categories depend on the former social groups for access to key resources, such as land, and 
“reciprocates” by supplying labor (Richards 1996). Mokuwa et al. (2011) provide an example 
of how social stratification in eastern Sierra Leone manifests itself in abusive local judicial 
systems. In rural Sierra Leone, exchange often takes the form of repeated, personalized 
interaction, embodied in kinship ties and patron-client relations. The location that villagers 
occupy in social networks (center versus periphery, or high-status versus low-status) may 
therefore affect bargaining positions, trading behavior, and ultimately trading outcomes. For 
example, Leach (1994, p.186) mentions that “a wide range of financial expectations is now 
associated with social relations of various kinds. These money transfers are not merely moral 
obligations; they also structure the relations of both power and security.” However, it is not 
a-priori clear how social relations will be manifested in the context of Sierra Leone’s rank-
based lineage systems characterized by strong patron-client relations. Patrons are expected to 
provide clients with economic and political support, in return for clients’ labor, political 
allegiance and other services (Leach 1994). While relatively wealthy and powerful principals 
are able to grab most of the surplus when interacting with their clients, they might prefer not 
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to do this (or rather; not always to do this). This experiment may function as an opportunity 
for principals to signal generosity and public-spiritedness, and their respect for local norms of 
generosity – thus cementing their position of authority. Trading generously could be an 
investment in the patron-client relationship that allows high-status participants to demand 
favors from low-status participants in the future (ties of ‘indebtedness’ which the giver can 
recall, for example, in the form of ‘voluntary’ labor provision by the client). 
In addition to specific relations and positions in local hierarchies, the social dimension 
also includes broader considerations related to (local) culture. For example, there may be 
moral imperatives to share, not to antagonize trading partners by appearing greedy, not to 
bargain hard for private gains, or not to deliberately strive for the accumulation of private 
wealth because this threatens existing systems of mutual dependency (e.g., Platteau 2001). 
Social norms prescribing acceptable or appropriate behavior apply to all villagers, and 
transcend personalized relations. Possibly such norms extend beyond the village, although 
parochial sentiments may of course imply that co-villagers are (or “should be”) treated 
differently than others. In what follows we try to examine the role of both individual social 
relations, and the position of individual in social networks, as well as general behavioral 
norms on trading behavior, and whether they extend beyond the village, or not. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Our test of competitive market theory is based on the experimental design of List 
(2004a,b), designed to “give neoclassical theory its best chance to succeed.” Like List, we 
used double-sided oral auctions (bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers) and 
multiple rounds (details below). Unlike List, we used subjects from rural African villages 
with very little access to markets or experience in trading. We recruited 1504 subjects from 
94 villages in eastern Sierra Leone, close to the border of the Gola Rainforest National Park. 
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Our design differs slightly from List—we used eight buyers and eight sellers (rather than 
twelve) and used ten rounds of trading (rather than five).
4
  
This study commenced with a series of pilot experiments in 16 villages in Sierra 
Leone, in the winter of 2011. We assigned villagers to various treatments of a double auction 
market experiment. In the benchmark treatment, we invited villagers to trade with their 
fellow villagers, and observed that levels of efficiency (measured as the share of potential 
rents captured by the trading partners) lagged behind levels of efficiency measured in 
Western contexts. However, we also observed that efficiency levels appear to respond to 
variation in the level of anonymity between players, suggesting local relationships matter for 
the functioning of markets. These findings encouraged us to scale up the experiment, so we 
returned to the field in the spring of 2013. The analysis below is based on these new data. We 
do not pool data from the two data waves because we adjusted the sampling procedure.
5
  
Our sample strategy and experimental design are as follows (detailed protocols and 
instruments are included in the Appendix). We invited participants to 24 central locations 
(typically a school) in ten of the 149 Chiefdoms in Sierra Leone. Participants were selected 
during a pre-experiment visit to the communities. We stratified the selection of participants 
by status in order to obtain the same number of high and low status individuals in each 
session. Specifically, we selected the nine highest status participants from each village (called 
“Taa Gbakoi'' in Mende the local language, which typically includes the village chief, town 
                                                 
4
 We wanted more than 5 rounds to give our experimental market a good chance to succeed in “converging” 
towards theoretical predictions. But logistical constrains also pose a limit on the number of rounds per session, 
and 10 rounds appeared as a reasonable compromise. 
5
 Specifically: we randomly invited villagers to participate for the pilot study, and deliberately “oversampled” 
members of the elite for the scaled-up version of the experiment (see main text, below). We have also analysed 
the pilot data, and for this (much smaller) sample we obtain results that are qualitatively different from the ones 
presented below, see Appendix. Specifically; in the pilot we observed that social relations and hierarchies are 
significant determinants of trade outcomes (high status participants are more likely to trade and conditional on 
trading make less profits). In contrast to the second round results, the middleman treatment (+3%) and inter 
village treatments (+5%) have higher profits than the intra village treatment. These differences are however not 
significant. This was likely due to the low power of the pilot study, motivating us to collect a new round of data. 
Since we significantly changed the participant selection protocol we could not pool the data but present results 
of the pilot in the appendix.  
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speaker, village imam, women's and youth leader). From the pool of “low-status individuals” 
in the village (locally referred to as “Nu Gbamei”, or “person of nothing”), we randomly 
selected nine to participate in the experiment.
6
 Ninety-seven percent of the people we invited 
were willing and even eager to participate. 
Experimental sessions lasted about two hours and began with an extensive 
introduction and a few practice rounds. We took great care to ensure participants understood 
the experiment by demonstrating example trades, asking them to explain the game back to us, 
and going through a few test runs. We created a market for a simple block of wood that had 
no inherent value. Participants were randomly assigned a role as either a buyer or a seller, and 
these roles were randomly re-allocated at the beginning of each trading round. Each trader 
privately received a randomly selected reservation price, or induced value, at the beginning of 
each round. Buyers were given a maximum willingness to pay and sellers were given a 
minimum willingness to accept for the wooden block. Buyers (sellers) were not allowed to 
trade above (below) their own reservation values. Profits earned in the trade (the difference 
between reservation value and agreed trading price) were paid to participants at the end of the 
experiment. Each trading round lasted five minutes. Traders were instructed that as soon as a 
trade was consummated, the buyer and seller had to approach a “trade master” (one of our 
research assistants) who recorded the trade and publicly announced the agreed price to all 
participants. Our main dependent variables are aggregate profits, market efficiency (profits 
captured in the trades divided by total potential profits), the number of trades, and profit 
earned on individual trades.  
                                                 
6
 In each village we selected nine individuals of the high- and low-status category even if we needed only eight 
to participate in the experiment. If all nine individuals showed up, we (randomly) send one home immediately 
after paying them the show-up fee. We told the village what day we would run the experiment. On that day, we 
arranged transport for preselected villagers, taking them to a central town where we had secured permission to 
use school classrooms. 
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Figure 1 summarizes the reservation prices experimentally induced in our 
experimental market. Market equilibrium occurs at a price between 4500 and 5500 Leones 
(or USD 1.05-1.28) and a quantity of five units traded. Importantly, in each round some 
buyers and sellers receive induced values that should place them out of the market. The 
induced value for three sellers is too high to profitably sell at the equilibrium price. Similarly, 
three buyers have reservation values that are too low to profitably purchase at the equilibrium 
price. Since reservation values are randomly assigned at the beginning of each round, the 
identity of subjects who are “in” or “out” of the market varies from one round to the next, and 
anchoring effects should be minimized. 
Our experiment involves four treatments, randomly assigned to each experimental 
group (hence each respondent participated in only one treatment). We used a blocked 
randomization design to spread treatments across trading locations. Table 2 summarizes the 
number of sessions conducted. In Treatment A, or the intra-village treatment, buyers and 
sellers come from the same village. Since the villages included in this study are small (less 
than 100 households), all subjects know each other. We ask buyers and sellers to engage in 
bilateral bargaining and haggling, interacting in a central market place. If our subjects bring 
their experiences from daily life into the lab, the trading outcomes in Treatment A may be 
governed both by generalized norms about behavior as well as by the position of individuals 
in the local hierarchy – deviations from the competitive market equilibrium might occur for 
two reasons. Treatment A allows us to address research question 1: 
RQ 1: If we run a continuous double auction market in a setting with participants 
who know and interact with each other outside the game, to what extent will trading behavior 
approach the level of market efficiency predicted by theory? To what extent do personal 
relations and general behavioral norms invite deviations from efficient trading? 
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Based on the findings in the pilot experiment, we expected efficiency levels in 
Treatment A to be lower than those obtained in experimental settings elsewhere. To probe 
whether efficiency is thwarted by norms or relations (networks) we introduce a second 
treatment. In Treatment B, or the inter-village treatment, all potential trading partners come 
from a different village. We made sure to invite subjects from villages relatively far apart so 
that the great majority of buyers and sellers would not know each other (this was confirmed 
by our exit survey, on average participants are far less likely to say they are related by blood, 
farm together, maintain regular contact or frequently exchange goods with participants from 
the opposite trading group). Hence, key features associated with one’s position in local 
networks (and personal relationships) are plausibly eliminated, as are norms about 
appropriate (trading) behavior in the village. By comparing behavior in treatments A and B 
we are able to address research question 2: 
RQ 2: Does the elimination of pre-existing social relations, hierarchies and within-
village behavioral norms affect market efficiency? 
To further probe these issues we developed Treatments C and D, in which we 
introduce middlemen as agents for the buyers. We used middlemen from other villages, 
unknown to all buyers and sellers before the experiment (but buyers and sellers are from the 
same village). Buyers and sellers now remained in separate rooms. Each buyer was assigned 
one middleman, and allowed to give that middleman any instructions he desired on how to 
negotiate during the trading period with sellers in the other room. There were still eight 
buyers and sellers, and the bargaining still took place in face-to-face interactions, only now 
those interactions were between middlemen and sellers. The middleman was paid a fixed 
wage for his efforts whether or not he made a trade and regardless of the profit he secured for 
the buyer, so there were no private (monetary) incentives to exert effort in searching or 
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bargaining. To avoid envy and resentment we paid middlemen approximately what the 
average trader earned for the day.  
We hypothesize that market structure may attenuate market distortions introduced by 
norms or social relations. We try to purge the cultural imperative to engage in gift giving or 
relaxed bargaining. Because buyers and sellers are not interacting face-to-face there is less 
social pressure to make trading decisions based on social considerations. Specifically, the 
middleman is not bargaining for his own profit, and can therefore bargain harder without 
appearing greedy or attempting to accumulate private wealth. Similarly, the seller is not 
engaging with the buyer directly, and does not know the broker personally, so he also can 
adopt a more business-oriented role. The middleman treatments therefore represent an 
alternative means to probe the relevance of behavioral norms vis-à-vis social relations. We 
ran two versions of the middlemen game. In Treatment C the middleman should reveal the 
identity of the buyer to the seller (and vice versa when returning to the buyer for additional 
instructions during the bargaining stage). In contrast, in Treatment D middlemen were 
instructed not to reveal the identity of buyers or sellers to the other transacting party 
(compliance with this rule was overseen by research assistants). Hence, while Treatment C 
may attenuate specific norms regarding appropriate trading behavior (but not necessarily 
eliminate social relationships between buyers and sellers), we argue that treatment D ensures 
full anonymity and attenuates the role of relationships and networks as well as specific 
norms.
7
 However, trading still occurs between co-villagers, and it is unclear a-priori to what 
extent behavioral norms are eliminated in Treatments C and D. 
We speculate that if within-village behavioral norms are the most important 
determinant of trading behavior, and if villagers have “internalized” such norms, the 
                                                 
7
 Observe that comparisons across treatments may be confounded by extra transaction costs associated with 
trading via middlemen. However, lack of time was never a binding factor in any of the trading rounds, so we 
believe this factor to be relatively unimportant. 
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outcomes in Treatments C and D will resemble outcomes in Treatment A. If norms are fully 
internalized such that they are relevant even in the context of anonymous trade, then 
outcomes in Treatment D will resemble outcomes in Treatment A. Instead, if social networks 
and specific relationships are the most important determinants of trading behavior, then 
outcomes in Treatment D should resemble outcomes in Treatment B (as such relationships 
are unimportant in both treatments). 
RQ 3: Does the introduction of a trading technology that makes trade more 
impersonal (i.e. middlemen) lead to greater efficiency? 
RQ 4: If so, is efficiency fostered by the technology of trading through an agent or by 
the anonymity of buyers and sellers? Is trading efficiency impeded by pre-existing social 
relationships or by behavioral norms? 
Empirically, we examine these issues in a regression format allowing us to control for 
relevant experimental design features (such as the randomization blocks and clustering). We 
include dummy variables for the separate treatments (using the intra-village treatment A as 
the omitted category). We first look at aggregate results by round and estimate: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝐵𝑗 + 𝛾𝑇𝐶𝑗 + 𝛿𝑇𝐷𝑗 + 𝜇𝑆𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗,    (1) 
Where 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗𝑟  is the efficiency of group j (with j = 1, …, 94) in round r (with r = 1, 
…, 10), Sk are the randomization block dummies (with k = 1, …, 24) and TB, TC and TD are 
the treatment dummies. We cluster standard errors at the level of the experimental group. We 
have estimated model (1) both for the full set of 10 rounds, and a restricted set of the final 
five rounds to take out learning dynamics during the first rounds of trading. Regression 
results are rather comparable, and we will only report results for the full set of data (results 
for the final five rounds are available on request). We also assess the number of trades 
completed by round, and the number of trades where participants made no profits.  
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Next, we wish to move beyond an aggregate measure of trading efficiency, and 
consider who gains from trade. We conduct an analysis at the level of the individual trader, 
and explain both participation in trade and gains from trade with a range of experimental and 
household (or respondent) variables. Specifically, for each respondent i from trading group j 
we estimate:  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑗 + 𝛾𝑇𝐶𝑗 + 𝛿𝑇𝐷𝑗 + 𝜃𝐶𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑆𝑘 + 𝛾𝑅𝑟 +  𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑗, (2) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑗 + 𝛾𝑇𝐶𝑗 + 𝛿𝑇𝐷𝑗 + 𝜃𝐶𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑆𝑘 + 𝛾𝑅𝑟 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑗, (3) 
Where Tradeirj indicates whether respondent i participated in a transaction in group j and 
round r , Profitirj captures the associated profits, CV is a vector of card values, R is a vector of 
round dummies, and X is a vector of trader characteristics (including a buyer dummy). We 
conjectured age, gender, income, and literacy to affect success in the game. In addition, we 
explore the effect of social status on trading propensity and profitability. As explained earlier, 
if participants use their game play to invest in patron-client networks or if they adhere to 
social norms of sharing with those in power in their local hierarchies, status would have a 
significant effect on trading behavior. Insights from the individual trade level data thus 
complement the aggregate analysis discussed above. 
We use two specifications when estimating model (3). We consider the case where the 
dependent variable is profits conditional on trading (as captured in equation (2)), as well as 
the case where all non-traders are coded as zero profit traders. The latter specification may be 
the more appropriate model in light of the fact that the decision to trade is to some extent 
endogenous (even if randomly assigned card values obviously matter as well). 
RQ 5: Do individual characteristics, including demographic information, social 
status, and social connectedness, explain trading behavior and profits in a systematic way? 
Based on our results from the pilot, we expected that men would earn more than 
women, and that high-status buyers would earn less than low-status buyers on average. Social 
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network effects are particularly difficult to theoretically pin down (see Jackson 2014 for a 
review). For example, reciprocity can be negative or positive, depending on unobserved 
behavior outside the game. Also, what is locally inefficient in the game may be globally 
efficient when analyzed in the context of real-world strategic interactions between 
experimental subjects. Because experiments have rarely used non-anonymous, personally 
connected subjects, when embedding games in real-life networks we had little information on 
which to base a prior belief. We view this study as an exploratory approach to informing 
theory on the workings of markets in a developing world context.  
After the trading sessions we implemented a short exit survey recording individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, literacy, farm size (number of acres) and prior trading 
experience. We also asked subjects about their motives for engaging in trade, in the 
experiment. As mentioned, we stratified sampling on status, or formal and informal positions 
of authority within the community (village chief, youth leader, women leader, religious 
leader, etc.). We create a binary variable to indicate whether a respondent holds such a 
position. During the exit interview we developed an alternative status proxy. We asked 
participants to line up in order of social status in their experimental group after the trading, 
which provided us with a respondent-specific ordinal measure of his or her position in the 
local hierarchy. Higher scores indicate a place at the back of the line and relatively low status. 
Our respondents had no difficulty agreeing on the proper line-up. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics for these variables (see Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions and 
summary statistics), and includes a balance test on the equality of means across all 
treatments. Most variables are balanced across treatment arms, except whether the respondent 
is a trader (higher in Treatment D) and of high status (higher in Treatments B and D). When 
we control for these variables in the regression models below, results are qualitatively 
identical. Nevertheless we acknowledge that the share of traders varies across treatments, and 
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this could be a confounding factor affecting overall efficiency. Of course there were also 
differences in the incidence of social relationships for the intra-village treatments and the 
inter-village treatment.
8
 These differences, however, are an important part of the treatment. 
 
4. Experimental Results: Aggregate Data 
Our first set of results is summarized in Figure 2 and Table 3. Panel A of Figure 2 
reports the average number of trades per round for each treatment, and Panel B reports 
average efficiency levels. When analyzing the aggregate data, we define efficiency of a 
particular round as the percentage of the potential surplus that is captured by the traders in 
that round. The maximum sum of producer and consumer surplus in our experimental market, 
as summarized in Figure 1, is 17,000 Leones. If the sum of producer and consumer surplus in 
a round equals, say, 14,000 Leones, the level of efficiency is simply 82%.  
A natural grouping of treatments is suggested in Figure 2. In terms of the number of 
trades, the intra- and inter-village treatments appear similar (A and B) as do the two 
middleman treatments (C and D), but these two sets appear distinct from each other. This 
provides tentative support for the hypothesis that norms about appropriate exchange behavior 
are important in impeding trading efficiency, and that trading outcomes can be changed by 
manipulating the trading technology. This pattern is not readily evident from the efficiency 
data (panel B). However, as panels A and B suggest, there is some learning during early 
stages of the experiment (especially in the middlemen treatments). To analyze these 
differences across treatment arms more formally below, we use a regression framework.  
Turning to Table 3, and focusing on intra-village Treatment A first, we observe that 
the number of trades is above theoretical predictions (5.6 on average rather than 5), and 
                                                 
8
  Comparing Treatment A to Treatment B, the percentage blood related drops from 29% to 4%, co-farming 
drops from 11% to 2%, regular contact goes from 56% to 6% and exchange partners from 20% to 3%. 
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associated efficiency levels are below theoretical predictions. This is consistent with a 
cultural imperative not to disappoint a potential trading partner (even if the surplus for trading 
is very small, and it may be better to search for an alternative trading partner). Overall, 
participants capture up to 84.4 percent of profits. The degree to which this is regarded as 
inefficient is, of course, subjective, but we do observe this figure is significantly lower (in 
relative terms) than efficiency levels reported in similar studies conducted in the lab and/or in 
the developed world (e.g. List 2004).  
Moreover, there is only limited evidence of convergence towards market equilibrium: 
while aggregate efficiency levels tend to increase between rounds 1-5 and rounds 6-10, the 
effect is small (difference is 2.4%), and not significant at conventional significance levels (p-
value = 0.11). A regression of efficiency on round ID gives a slope of 0.3 with a p-value of 
0.27 (standard errors clustered at experimental session). As a comparison, List’s field study, 
focusing on sports card trading, yielded 89 percent efficiency in the first round and 97 percent 
efficiency in the fourth and fifth rounds. There is no such trend for Treatment A. This 
suggests other motivations, perhaps related to social structures and pre-existing relationships, 
may interfere with market behavior and compromise efficiency. This leads to the following 
result:  
Result 1: Within our subject pool the intra-village treatment yields trade behavior 
that is somewhat less efficient than would be predicted by economic theory. There is no 
convergence across rounds of trading. 
Also observe from Table 3, we are studying a market where buyers are able to secure 
most of the profits from trade. This may reflect a cultural imperative, or may be an artefact of 
our design (for example: while sellers were asked to stay in the same location, buyers were 
encouraged to move around and learn about alternative offers). 
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Result 2: There is an asymmetry in our experimental market: buyers on average make 
greater profits than sellers. 
We next examine whether face-to-face interaction matters for economic behavior, or 
whether norms about appropriate behavior affect profits from trade. To this end we compare 
profits across the four treatments. This can be done by casually inspecting trading outcomes 
in Table 3, or by using a regression framework. We formally test the comparisons in Table 4. 
As is evident, efficiency increases by 2.75% when participants are trading with fellow 
villagers, compared to a situation where they have to trade with strangers. To some extent 
this is not surprising – it is well-known to economists that social relationships may lower 
transaction costs and that markets can only function properly in the context of trust 
(Fafchamps 2004). But anthropologists have pointed to the role of patron-client and kinship 
networks as factors impeding efficiency. While such concerns may indeed mediate the 
allocation of goods within tightly knit communities, we do not find that trading outcomes are 
less efficient. The reverse is true in our experiment. 
In contrast, we observe that the introduction of a trading technology eliminating face-
to-face interaction between the buyer and seller (“middlemen”) does not affect efficiency. 
The dummies associates with treatments C and D are not significantly different from zero. 
Hence eliminating face-to-face interaction with co-villagers, or even making trade with co-
villagers fully anonymous, does not affect efficiency compared to regular intra-village trade. 
It appears as if specific social relations are relatively unimportant for overall efficiency, but 
that within-village norms of appropriate behavior do matter and persist across trading 
technologies.  
Interestingly, while personal relationships (A) and impersonal trading (C,D) have the 
same effect on overall efficiency, they arrive at this outcome via different channels. 
Specifically, and as evident from columns (4-5) of Table 4, the middlemen treatments 
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improve efficiency by lowering the number of trades, and weeding out transactions that 
should not have occurred (because they involve partners that should have been “out of the 
market” given their induced values) or that generate zero profit for at least one of the trading 
partners.  
Another observation is noteworthy. Trading with people from a different village 
lowers efficiency because sellers earn less than in the intra-village treatments (column 3). It 
appears as if buyers are more generous towards sellers from their own village than towards 
villagers from other villagers. Representation by a middleman does not seem to matter, which 
speaks to an emerging literature suggesting the involvement of delegates may invite more 
selfish behavior (e.g., Hamman et al. (2010), Coffman (2011)). 
Result 3: Face-to-face trading with an unknown partner from another village reduces 
efficiency, and especially sellers earn less when engaging with somebody from another 
village. When trading with a co-villager, respondents achieve higher overall efficiency 
regardless of the trading technology or the level of anonymity of the trading partner.  
Alternative explanations exist for why trading via middlemen produces more efficient 
outcomes than the inter-village treatment. Middlemen have no incentive to make a trade, and 
can more credibly threaten to walk away from any potential deal. Another compelling 
interpretation is that the act of giving instructions to the middleman helped the buyer to make 
more rational trading choices, and the fact that the buyer could not readjust his or her strategy 
on the fly in reaction to social pressures meant that the rational trading strategy was more 
likely to be followed. That is, perhaps the middlemen treatment fosters commitment to a 
specific trading strategy.  However, observe that these explanations appear inconsistent with 
the finding that the extra value that is created is not shifted to the buyer that is represented by 
the middleman, and with the simple observation that efficiency is not different than in 
Treatment A. Alternatively, in case the broker has to consult regularly with the buyer, it may 
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be true that the “cost of trading” varies across treatments. This could be another factor 
explaining differences in trading behavior and outcomes – if the process of trading through a 
middleman is more time consuming, the low number of trades may have been caused 
mechanically by less time available to negotiate. However, we view this as unlikely because 
the time limit was not a binding constraint in the trading sessions.  
 
5. Experimental Results: Trader-Level Data  
We next explore the efficiency of trades in more detail at the level of individual 
traders. In Table 5A we estimate a series of parsimonious OLS models, only including as 
controls the dummies for randomization blocks, and a vector of experimental variables: 
treatment dummies, induced (card) values, a buyer dummy, and trading round dummies.
9
 
Echoing earlier results, column (1) reveals that the propensity to engage in trade is 
reduced when middlemen are active. Individuals are 9-11% less likely to exchange when 
trading via a middleman. In the other columns we explain variation in individual profits 
(controlling for the same covariates). In column (2) we focus on the subsample of agents who 
actually made a trade, and in column (3) we also consider participants who did not engage in 
trade (for example because of unfavorable induced values) and include them as zero-profit 
traders. Not surprisingly, we again find that trading outcomes are “worse” in the inter-village 
treatment. But another insight emerges from these columns. While the middleman trading 
technology is equally efficient as Treatment A, it produces high profits for a smaller 
subsample of respondents. The “gap” in profits under the middlemen scenarios and the intra-
village scenario diminishes when zero-profit traders are included in the analysis. That is; the 
middlemen treatments raise profits, and cluster these profits in the hands of a relatively small 
                                                 
9
 Similar results are obtained when using a logistic or probit model to explain variation in the decision to engage 
in trade—details available on request. 
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number of villagers. Profits in Treatment A are significantly lower than in Treatments C and 
D when zooming in on the subset of traders, but this gap evaporates when also taking the 
non-traders into account.  
Result 4: Intra-village Treatment A spreads the profits from trade more equally 
across participants than the treatments involving middlemen.  
Not surprisingly, card values matter as well (see Appendix Table A2). For buyers, 
higher card values are also associated with a greater probability of trading, and greater 
profits. The reverse is true for sellers, which is of course what we would expect if players 
understood the game. Finally, the coefficients of the round dummies do not vary much (for 
trade and profit models), confirming the lack of convergence at the aggregate level in our 
experimental market towards theoretical predictions. 
We find similar results when controlling for individual (and experimental) 
characteristics. These results are provided in the top 3 rows of Table 5B. Some individual 
characteristics are significantly associated with the propensity to trade or the profits from 
trade. Literate participants are more likely to trade. Consistent with other writings, we find 
that older participants and women tend to earn less from trade. While the effects for age and 
literacy are relatively small, the gender effect seems to be not only statistically but also 
economically significant. There is little literature on how individual characteristics may 
matter for personal exchange. The literature mainly focuses on the role of market experience 
(see List, 2003). Insofar as age, gender and literacy proxy market experience, the results are 
consistent with a perspective that younger and literate males are more likely to trade and 
make higher profits. But observe that the trader dummy does not enter significantly, so it 
appears as if market experience is less important in our setting than in other contexts that 
have been studied. Average profits from trading (pooling across treatments and rounds) 
amount to Le 1350, so on average trading men earn about 7 percent more than women. This 
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effect is similar in size as being some 27 years older, according to the regression coefficients. 
In contrast, farm size (our proxy for wealth) is not correlated with profits in the experiment.
10
  
Contrary to our expectations we find across our models that our status variables do 
not enter as significant determinants of profit. This is true for the social line up variable as 
well as the authority dummy. Hence, while social relationships and knowledge of the identity 
of trading partners helps to overcome trading inefficiencies, they do not systematically favor 
certain social groups over others – high status individuals do not exploit low status 
individuals, but they also do not appear to be particularly generous towards them. 
Result 5: Several individual characteristics (age, gender and literacy) are correlated 
with trading behavior in the market experiment. Status and social connectedness do not seem 
to be major determinants of trading performance.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
We use a field experiment in rural Sierra Leone to study how trading behavior 
conforms to neoclassical market theory. We extend the testing of competitive market theory 
into the field, and hope that our explorations will be useful to sharpen theoretical predictions. 
Unlike earlier field experiments, our results are based on a subject pool of subsistence 
farmers from a remote region of Sierra Leone, Africa. While our respondents occasionally 
exchange goods and services in market settings, their normal exchange patterns are based on 
repeated and personalized interaction, and rarely involve cash prices. Our study is also 
markedly different than others in the literature because our participants are socially connected 
in daily life. They are from the same social networks. Based on previous literature and a pilot 
study we developed an experimental design with treatments that allow us to explore the 
                                                 
10
 In other words: while there is some heterogeneity in literacy, wealth or experience in our sample, this 
heterogeneity does not explain variation in profits in the experiment. We therefore have no reason to attribute 
the relatively low levels of trading efficiency (compared to previous trading experiments) in our experiment to 
low average levels of literacy, wealth and experience. 
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dynamics of real-life interactions in rural Sierra Leone, including friendship, animosity, 
patron-client relationships, and reciprocation of all types. This allows us to study the effects 
of (and interaction between) behavioral norms and pre-existing social relations on trading 
efficiency in a unique geographical setting. Our results speak to the transformation from 
personalized exchange to anonymous exchange that has historically taken place as economies 
develop.  
With the paucity of data on behavior in competitive markets in developing countries, 
our (explorative) study offers novel perspectives and opens new directions for additional 
research. It offers mixed support for the hypothesis that the introduction of competitive 
markets produces efficient outcomes in the setting we study. Inter-village trade is relatively 
inefficient for our sample of African subsistence farmers, and we find no evidence of market 
convergence across rounds. Efficiency decreases in the inter-village treatment, and in contrast 
to the literature emphasizing the adverse impacts of kinship networks or local hierarchies on 
economic efficiency, we find that socially-connected traders do better than socially-
unconnected ones – not worse. This finding may also speak to the literature on the role of 
parochialism in trade. For example, studying trade across ethnic groups (rather than across 
villages), Bowles and Gintis (2004) find that foregoing trading opportunities with “outsiders” 
may facilitate trade with co-ethnics, so that exchange within narrow parochial networks may 
co-exist alongside anonymous market trade. While we do not observe that villagers decline to 
trade with outsiders, the terms of trade appear different and overall efficiency gains are 
reduced. Future research could explore to what extent these tendencies are caused by a 
preference for practices geared towards excluding people from other villages, or by the 
evolution of within-village information and enforcement structures that do the same. 
We also find that the efficiency of intra-village trade is not thwarted when we make 
trade “more anonymous.” This is consistent with norms of appropriate behavior towards 
24 
 
fellow villagers that are to some extent internalized by our respondents. Nevertheless, there 
are differences across the intra-village treatments, depending on whether or not there is face-
to-face interaction between agents and the level of anonymity. Specifically, too many trades 
take place when trading takes place on a face-to-face basis, so it appears as if our subjects 
(especially our sellers) are averse to disappointing potential trading partners. They engage in 
exchange even if the surplus is small and one of the trader parties could do better by walking 
away and search for another partner with a more favorable reservation price.
11
 This seems 
easier when interacting with somebody who has no personal stake in the trade. Future 
research should examine this further, and also address the concern that not all observables 
were balanced across treatment arms (e.g. the share of traders in the sample was some 20% 
larger in one of the middlemen treatments). 
Individual-level profit results allow us to probe the determinants of trade a little 
deeper. Confirming the patterns in the aggregate data, we again find that social relationships 
are relatively unimportant as determinants of trading behavior. While variables such as 
gender and age affect the profits from engaging in trade, other important variables such as 
literacy, farm size (wealth proxy) and trading experience do not affect individual profits. We 
also do not find that status or the position within local hierarchies affects trading outcomes. 
High status individuals do not exploit low status individuals, but also do not seek them out 
for favors. 
The generality of our results come with some qualifications . On the one hand, this 
region of Sierra Leone is representative of only select areas of Africa. It is an isolated and 
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 We do not claim that our findings spill over to other domains of human interaction than market behavior. For 
example, other studies have shown that social relations and hierarchies matter greatly for, say, pro-social 
behavior (e.g., Baldassari and Grossman 2013). 
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forested region, with very low incomes, and low levels of market integration.
12
 The finding 
that neoclassical theory does not fare so badly even in this extreme context is perhaps 
remarkable. Our finding that behavioral norms may be more important than social 
relationships may reflect local Mende culture, which is distinct from other (African) cultures 
(e.g., Leach 1994, Richards 1996).
13
 Further research should explore to what extent our 
results extend to other regions in (West) Africa and the world. An alternative interpretation of 
external validity concerns generalizability beyond the (Sierra Leonean) lab. For example, the 
suggestion that cultural norms adversely affect efficiency might partly explain why so much 
of interregional trade in Sierra Leone used to be organized through agents and subagents – 
“trading on commission” (Riddell 1974). The standard explanation for the widespread 
occurrence of this phenomenon is based on low trading volumes and high transaction costs 
(rendering trading on commission efficient), but we conjecture that behavioral imperatives 
might also play a role (of course we recognize the two need not be independent).  
Finally, earlier theoretical studies of the transition from personalized to anonymous 
exchange assume traders are of a specific type—flourishing in either personalized or 
anonymous exchange. For example, Kranton (1996) assumes agents choose to become a 
reciprocal trader or an anonymous trader, but not both. Similarly, Kumar and Matsusaka 
(2009) assume agents can use only one of two types of human capital: local capital 
(facilitating personalized exchange) or market capital (facilitating anonymous exchange). 
Such specialization in specific trade modalities combined with complementarities in trade 
(the gain from being a personalized trader increases as the share of personalized traders in the 
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 Other data suggest that our sample is not necessarily representative for Sierra Leone as a whole (certainly not 
for urban areas). For example, Muslims (97%) and Mende-ethnics (92%) are over-represented in our sample, 
compared to the national average (60% and 31%, respectively, see CIA 2013). 
13
 The Mende society we study is part of a larger group of slave-based ranked lineage societies, characterized by 
a chieftaincy institution and a large labouring underclass. These are agrarian communities occupying the 
margins of the Upper Guinean Forest. For a treatment of these societies, and a comparison with more  
egalitarian communities at the forest core, refer to Chauveau and Richards (2008). 
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population goes up) implies scope for so-called “lock-in effects” where inefficient equilibria 
persist. Our results cast new light on this issue, and attenuate concerns about lock-in 
phenomena. While changing cultural imperatives about appropriate (trading) behavior may be 
a difficult and slow process, our sample of inexperienced traders is able to quickly adapt its 
behavior, seizing potential gains from trade, if we alter the market institution. This implies 
that if structural features of rural markets can be adjusted, for example by introducing agents 
of change (brokers) linking rural producers to regional markets, trading efficiency could 
improve rapidly. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental Market 
Note: Figure plots reservation values (in Leone) of the experimental market. 
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Figure 2. Number of Trades and Efficiency by Treatment A to D 
Notes: Efficient outcome is 5 units traded and 100% of profits captured 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Balance statistics 
 Treatment   
 
A B C D F test 
(p-values)  
N 
Age 
(years) 
42.167 42.630 42.641 42.073 0.950 1502 
(se) (0.981) (0.908) (0.788) (0.929)  
 
Literate 0.251 0.261 0.189 0.226 0.200 1423 
(se) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.034)  
 
Male  0.662 0.701 0.649 0.646 0.387 1500 
(se) (0.029) (0.026) (0.018) (0.027)  
 
Farm size 
(acres) 
2.608 2.504 2.304 2.311 0.229 1491 
(se) (0.129) (0.107) (0.127) (0.126)  
 
Trader 0.415 0.398 0.398 0.531 0.041 1501 
(se) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039)  
 
Social 
order 
8.591 8.500 8.495 8.500 0.187 1424 
(se) (0.103) (0.017) (0.005) (0.004)  
 
High 
status 
0.399 0.452 0.375 0.467 0.043 1497 
(se) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.040)  
 
 
Note: Data is at the individual respondent level, with p-values clustered at village level.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Trading Sessions 
 Sessions Number of 
Participants 
Total 
Observations 
Total Trades 
Executed 
 
A: Intra-village 23 368 3680 1295 
B: Inter-village  24 384 3840 1331 
C: Middlemen 
revealed 23 368 3680 1134 
D: Middlemen 
anonymous  24 384 3840 1119 
Total across 
treatments 94 1504 15040 4879 
 
Notes: Each experimental session contains subjects from a different village (94 in total), except for Treatment B 
where half the subjects are from a different village. Each session contains data for 16 participants (8 buyers and 
8 sellers) and 10 rounds.  
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Table 3. Trading behavior across treatments 
Market Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Treatment A (intra 
village) 
         
 
Average price (Leone) 4940,37 4826,81 4853,00 4846,01 4919,20 4790,37 4970,81 4757,51 4817,91 4859,42 
SD 1404,84 1269,90 1349,01 1367,32 1440,43 1229,05 1258,64 1261,03 1237,31 1260,51 
Trade 5,39 5,26 5,78 5,61 5,57 5,57 5,78 5,61 5,96 5,78 
Trade in core 2,22 2,61 2,52 2,13 2,61 2,61 2,83 2,87 2,78 2,83 
Trade without profits 0,48 0,48 0,91 0,52 0,96 0,78 0,70 0,74 0,78 0,91 
Efficiency 0,82 0,86 0,85 0,83 0,80 0,86 0,86 0,85 0,86 0,85 
Buyer efficiency share 0,44 0,48 0,48 0,46 0,43 0,50 0,46 0,48 0,48 0,47 
Seller efficiency share  0,38 0,38 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,36 0,40 0,37 0,38 0,38 
           
Treatment B (inter 
village) 
         
 
Average price (Leone) 4740,53 4597,21 4734,31 4821,18 4851,84 4713,61 4772,40 4720,14 4887,00 4776.3 
SD 1436,11 1322,41 1192,38 1397,17 1349,67 1291,07 1176,26 1396,82 1383,39 1309.1 
Trade 5,13 5,35 5,25 5,79 5,67 5,48 5,88 5,88 5,88 5.6 
Trade in core 2,38 2,48 2,71 2,58 2,88 2,87 2,96 2,71 2,67 2.9 
Trade without profits 0,42 0,61 0,50 0,83 0,71 0,61 0,88 0,83 0,58 0,6 
Efficiency 0,79 0,81 0,87 0,81 0,85 0,83 0,85 0,79 0,81 82.6 
Buyer efficiency share 0,47 0,51 0,53 0,47 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,48 0,45 57.4 
Seller efficiency share  0,32 0,30 0,34 0,34 0,34 0,33 0,35 0,30 0,36 42.6 
           
Treatment C 
(Middlemen revealed) 
         
 
Average price (Leone) 4632,97 4688,41 4709,73 4650,72 4567,75 4730,43 4822,26 4749,07 4817,03 4797.1 
SD 1015,64 1017,38 1103,08 1044,25 1085,07 1015,22 1056,57 956,07 971,34 860.0 
Trade 3,78 4,91 4,96 4,91 5,26 5,04 4,87 5,39 5,13 5.0 
Trade in core 1,74 2,43 2,30 2,52 2,35 2,70 2,70 3,04 2,70 2.7 
Trade without profits 0,35 0,26 0,43 0,22 0,39 0,13 0,30 0,52 0,17 0,4 
Efficiency 0,67 0,87 0,84 0,85 0,85 0,86 0,82 0,87 0,88 87.4 
Buyer efficiency share 0,38 0,49 0,50 0,49 0,51 0,48 0,45 0,48 0,48 52.8 
Seller efficiency share  0,29 0,38 0,34 0,36 0,34 0,38 0,36 0,39 0,41 47.2 
           
Treatment D 
(Middlemen 
anonymous) 
         
 
Average price (Leone) 4743,48 4682,99 4598,26 4687,15 4600,35 4639,24 4767,43 4723,61 4803,47 4790.3 
SD 1066,49 1061,59 1014,90 922,63 921,55 967,10 930,34 898,57 992,87 1052.7 
Trade 3,70 4,71 4,29 4,63 4,46 4,71 4,92 5,00 5,13 5.3 
Trade in core 1,39 2,42 2,21 2,75 2,67 2,71 2,71 3,04 2,88 2.8 
Trade without profits 0,04 0,33 0,38 0,17 0,13 0,21 0,38 0,13 0,29 0,3 
Efficiency 0,73 0,84 0,81 0,88 0,78 0,88 0,88 0,91 0,86 88.5 
Buyer efficiency share 0,44 0,50 0,47 0,51 0,44 0,52 0,49 0,52 0,46 56.1 
Seller efficiency share  0,30 0,34 0,34 0,37 0,35 0,37 0,39 0,39 0,40 43.9 
 
Note: Tables reports round averages.  
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Table 4. Analysis of aggregate trading behavior 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Overall 
efficiency 
Efficiency 
buyer 
Efficiency 
seller 
# Trades 
# trades with 
no profit 
B -0.0275* 0.0208 -0.0484*** 0.0573 0.0495 
 (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0167) (0.116) (0.189) 
      
C -0.0117 0.00394 -0.0157 -0.641*** -0.454*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0165) (0.105) (0.148) 
      
D -0.000740 0.0158 -0.0165 -0.894*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0140) (0.0865) (0.128) 
      
Constant 0.855*** 0.486*** 0.368*** 5.834*** 1.147*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0194) (0.0140) (0.144) (0.273) 
Observations 917 917 917 917 917 
Number of 
Clusters 
92 92 92 92 92 
B=C 0.20 0.25 0.034 0.000 0.002 
B=D 0.021 0.69 0.021 4.6e-15 0.0011 
C=D 0.36 0.35 0.95 0.0092 0.87 
 
Estimated using OLS. Regression includes blocking (experimental location) fixed effect. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Table 5A. Trading outcomes as explained by experimental variables 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Trade YN Trade profit 
Profit,  
0=notrade 
B 0.00717 -65.20** -43.04*** 
 (0.0150) (30.07) (15.59) 
    
C -0.0871*** 104.9*** -14.76 
 (0.0148) (30.84) (15.83) 
    
D -0.111*** 167.1*** 9.368 
 (0.0107) (21.57) (12.76) 
Observations 14672 9554 14672 
Number of Clusters 92 92 92 
Mean dep var 
Treatment A 
   
B=C 1.0e-08 0.000000080 0.031 
B=D 4.3e-14 8.4e-15 0.000045 
C=D 0.085 0.024 0.091 
 
Estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is decision to trade and profits. Regression includes blocking 
(experimental location) fixed effect, induced values, buyer dummy and round dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Table 5B. Trading outcomes as explained by experimental variables and observables 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Trade YN Trade profit Profit, 0=notrade 
B -0.00199 -50.57* -35.75** 
 (0.0142) (30.39) (17.50) 
    
C -0.0875*** 115.5*** -5.549 
 (0.0149) (33.81) (18.18) 
    
D -0.112*** 183.8*** 22.38 
 (0.0103) (23.02) (14.62) 
    
Age -0.0002 -2.991*** -2.292*** 
 (0.0002) (0.953) (0.630) 
    
Literate 0.0299*** 10.17 35.51* 
 (0.009) (29.16) (20.26) 
    
Gender -0.0039 82.28*** 50.66*** 
 (0.008) (23.77) (18.08) 
    
Farm size 0.002 -4.638 -0.221 
 (0.0018) (6.198) (4.348) 
    
Trader 0.004 25.96 19.48 
 (0.005) (21.82) (15.54) 
    
Social Line-up  -0.0006 -1.830 -1.619 
Order (0.0007) (3.125) (2.162) 
    
High Status -0.004 1.785 9.168 
 (0.007) (28.06) (19.77) 
    
Observations 12996 8423 12996 
Number of Clusters 90 90 90 
B=C 0.000 0.000 0.053 
B=D 0.000 0.000 0.000 
C=D 0.090 0.023 0.098 
 
Estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is decision to trade. Even columns restrict the sample to the last 5 
rounds. Regression includes blocking (experimental location) fixed effect, induced values, buyer dummy and 
round dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix A: Additional tables 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Variable definition Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Age  Respondent age in years 1502 42.38 15.38 5 99 
Literate Dummy, 1 if respondent can read and write 1423 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Male  Dummy, 1 if respondent is male 1500 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Farm size (acres) Respondent farm size (bushels of upland rice planted last year) 1491 2.43 1.73 0 16 
Trader Dummy, 1 if respondent is trader 1501 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Social order Respondent place in line up in order of who is the most influential, 
second most influential, etc. in village 
1424 8.52 4.61 1 16 
High status Dummy, 1 if subject is village chief, religious leader, youth leader, 
woman’s leader or other male leader  
1497 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Note: Data is at the individual participant level taken from the exit survey.  
 
Table A2. Trading Outcomes as Explained by Experimental Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Trade YN Trade YN Trade profit Trade profit 
Profit, 
0=notrade 
Profit, 
0=notrade 
A -0.00717 -0.0310* 65.20** 126.2*** 43.04*** 71.17*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0160) (30.07) (33.91) (15.59) (21.31) 
       
C -0.0943*** -0.0945*** 170.1*** 195.5*** 28.28** 55.46*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0147) (29.13) (27.43) (12.94) (18.09) 
       
D -0.118*** -0.113*** 232.3*** 267.9*** 52.40*** 103.1*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0144) (25.04) (28.82) (12.22) (16.91) 
       
cvb==2500 -0.129*** -0.149*** -289.4*** 0 -121.6*** -118.8*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0251) (46.16) (0) (14.03) (18.72) 
       
cvb==3500 0 0 0 190.6*** 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (60.75) (0) (0) 
       
cvb==4500 0.254*** 0.277*** -26.47 189.1** 167.7*** 182.0*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0291) (46.13) (73.96) (21.75) (34.89) 
       
cvb==5500 0.552*** 0.571*** 272.4*** 484.0*** 614.7*** 631.7*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0250) (45.32) (57.55) (23.27) (30.83) 
       
cvb==6500 0.648*** 0.646*** 699.3*** 883.5*** 1091.8*** 1065.6*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0282) (47.63) (74.12) (36.90) (54.83) 
       
cvb==7500 0.698*** 0.703*** 1392.0*** 1655.3*** 1812.1*** 1884.5*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0228) (59.94) (83.18) (49.93) (61.99) 
       
cvb==8500 0.717*** 0.709*** 2233.2*** 2406.4*** 2655.7*** 2625.5*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0231) (62.87) (94.96) (55.72) (77.56) 
       
cvs==1500 0.785*** 0.0558*** 1712.4*** 1826.3*** 2096.1*** 1375.2*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0138) (69.69) (90.18) (66.00) (69.38) 
       
cvs==2500 0.769*** 0.0449*** 1083.4*** 1044.2*** 1452.6*** 580.5*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0130) (51.97) (70.16) (47.76) (57.90) 
       
cvs==3500 0.714*** 0 516.2*** 498.1*** 851.9*** 0 
 (0.0232) (0) (40.52) (55.50) (32.00) (0) 
       
cvs==4500 0.608*** -0.0739*** 164.7*** 150.4*** 447.4*** -384.4*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0176) (31.38) (47.64) (19.89) (38.48) 
       
cvs==5500 0.277*** -0.454*** 13.30 -23.08 147.2*** -731.5*** 
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 (0.0237) (0.0295) (33.12) (47.74) (14.95) (38.23) 
       
cvs==6500 0 -0.744*** 0 0 0 -870.5*** 
 (0) (0.0258) (0) (0) (0) (37.96) 
       
cvs==7500 -0.123*** -0.859*** -124.9** -42.35 -66.32*** -930.4*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0194) (49.73) (53.08) (10.20) (35.47) 
       
Dummy, 1 if 
mistake in S/D 
curve 
0.0112 -0.0219 53.91* 110.5*** 54.83*** 68.20*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0144) (28.81) (32.60) (14.17) (20.80) 
       
round_id==2 0.0680*** 0 4.368 0 90.61*** 0 
 (0.0174) (0) (25.76) (0) (21.95) (0) 
       
round_id==3 0.0674*** 0 4.286 0 88.11*** 0 
 (0.0175) (0) (26.15) (0) (21.86) (0) 
       
round_id==4 0.0892*** 0 -25.51 0 92.91*** 0 
 (0.0155) (0) (25.17) (0) (21.91) (0) 
       
round_id==5 0.0889*** 0 -43.73 0 70.24*** 0 
 (0.0171) (0) (26.39) (0) (20.15) (0) 
       
round_id==6 0.0849*** 0 -3.219 0 108.3*** 0 
 (0.0177) (0) (26.86) (0) (22.30) (0) 
       
round_id==7 0.105*** 0.0208 -29.40 -25.83 99.66*** -8.166 
 (0.0167) (0.0134) (24.83) (27.50) (20.04) (16.88) 
       
round_id==8 0.120*** 0.0357** -48.01 -45.14 104.4*** -3.411 
 (0.0180) (0.0139) (29.22) (28.60) (19.97) (16.96) 
       
round_id==9 0.125*** 0.0408*** -54.12* -51.69* 102.6*** -5.199 
 (0.0160) (0.0124) (28.02) (27.92) (21.10) (17.30) 
       
round_id==10 0.114*** 0.0297** -34.51 -32.37 107.8*** -0.0693 
 (0.0170) (0.0138) (28.00) (26.63) (21.15) (15.67) 
       
buyer 0.0430** -0.680*** 199.1*** -48.56 71.33*** -798.8*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0243) (43.36) (61.45) (14.15) (43.72) 
       
Constant 0.196*** 0.999*** 386.1*** 349.8*** -23.14 883.4*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0309) (53.36) (58.39) (28.47) (44.97) 
Observations 14672 7344 9554 4954 14672 7344 
Number of 
Clusters 
92 92 92 92 92 92 
A=C 0.000000068 0.000051 0.0010 0.038 0.35 0.45 
A=D 5.2e-17 1.7e-11 1.3e-11 0.00000037 0.46 0.063 
C=D 5.2e-17 0.19 1.3e-11 0.0097 0.46 0.0095 
Estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is decision to trade. Even columns restrict the sample to the last 5 
rounds. Regression includes blocking (experimental location) fixed effect. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Experimental Protocol and Instruments 
 
See separate appendix documents: the experimental protocol (B1) and instruments (B2). 
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Appendix C: Experimental Results Round 1 
 
 
Table C1. Descriptive Statistics Trading Sessions 
 Sessions Number of 
Participants 
Total 
Observations 
(Participant-
Rounds) 
Total Trades 
Executed 
(Trade-Rounds) 
Control 7 112 480 314 
Middlemen  3 48 224 154 
All strangers 5 80 360 246 
 
 
Table C2. Trading behavior across the three treatments 
Market period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Panel A: Base treatment: trade with co-villagers  
Average price  4432 5062 4844 4809 4937 4802 5006 4877 4765 4822 
SD 721 442 515 521 230 463 182 360 491 400 
Buyer Profit  9000 6429 8357 7286 7643 7800 7300 7900 7200 8500 
Seller Profit 5286 6000 6357 5429 7071 6000 6500 6900 6200 6500 
Trades (N) 4.1 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.9 5.8 6.0 5.2 5.8 5.4 
Trades in core 2.0 1.9 2.6 2.3 3.4 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.6 3.0 
Efficiency 84% 73% 87% 75% 87% 81% 81% 87% 79% 88% 
           
Panel B: Middlemen treatment: trade through middlemen  
Average price  5278 5050 4800 4889 4983 4883 4472 4833 4936 4642 
SD 385 136 346 96 275 375 413 382 192 625 
Buyer Profit  6000 7500 7833 7833 8333 8167 9333 7333 7750 8500 
Seller Profit  6333 6500 6833 7167 7667 7500 5667 6333 5750 6500 
Trades (N) 4.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.3 5.7 5.3 6.3 6.0 5.5 
Trades in core  1.3 2.7 3.3 2.7 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.0 3.5 
Efficiency 73% 82% 86% 88% 94% 92% 88% 80% 79% 88% 
           
Panel C: Inter-village treatment: trade with individuals from other villages  
Average price  4730 5016 4848 4823 4880 4992 5013 4608 4671 4788 
SD 179 341 509 284 295 232 401 79 513 25 
Buyer Profit  8400 7700 6900 8400 7600 7750 7500 8875 9750 8500 
Seller Profit  6800 6700 6700 6400 6600 7500 7250 5875 6500 6750 
Trades (N) 5.2 5.8 5.2 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.3 
Trades in core  2.8 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 
Efficiency 89% 85% 80% 87% 84% 90% 87% 87% 96% 90% 
 
 
 
Table C3. Efficiency Round 1 data 
 (1) (2) 
 efficiency # trades 
Inter village 0.0510 0.233 
 (0.0459) (0.261) 
   
Middlemen 0.0333 0.267 
 (0.0495) (0.316) 
   
Constant 0.820*** 5.233*** 
 (0.0430) (0.204) 
Observations 133 133 
Number of Clusters 15 15 
Intra = Middleman 0.56 0.91 
Estimated using OLS. Standard errors clustered at experimental group level * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
39 
 
 
 
Table C4. Trade outcomes Round 1 Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Trade YN Trade YN Trade profit Trade profit 
Profit, 
0=notrade 
Profit, 
0=notrade 
Intra village -0.0291 -0.0116 -31.43 -52.53 -56.23 -59.26 
 (0.0304) (0.0275) (68.31) (70.98) (49.60) (50.00) 
       
Middlemen 0.00377 0.0193 -22.69 -32.44 -17.45 -12.45 
 (0.0364) (0.0352) (47.61) (43.82) (28.77) (23.51) 
       
cvb==2500 -0.137*** -0.127*** -203.8** -174.7** -94.83*** -93.69*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0318) (81.59) (75.48) (16.36) (22.21) 
       
cvb==3500 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
       
cvb==4500 0.232*** 0.231*** 76.06 50.36 154.0*** 141.9*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0588) (70.36) (55.74) (31.66) (29.91) 
       
cvb==5500 0.544*** 0.547*** 363.9*** 337.9*** 561.5*** 542.8*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0589) (60.90) (74.83) (45.06) (56.16) 
       
cvb==6500 0.645*** 0.650*** 889.4*** 892.8*** 1130.7*** 1139.7*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0632) (58.90) (71.64) (81.90) (87.79) 
       
cvb==7500 0.697*** 0.704*** 1681.5*** 1696.1*** 1964.7*** 1980.5*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0488) (135.5) (141.4) (127.5) (130.5) 
       
cvb==8500 0.712*** 0.716*** 2252.5*** 2248.7*** 2555.5*** 2558.0*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0414) (137.0) (148.6) (139.3) (143.6) 
       
cvs==1500 0.871*** 0.867*** 2211.6*** 2041.2*** 2413.5*** 2417.4*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0505) (233.7) (231.4) (197.9) (200.1) 
       
cvs==2500 0.871*** 0.873*** 1185.6*** 1015.5*** 1417.2*** 1425.7*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0536) (116.4) (193.0) (115.1) (114.2) 
       
cvs==3500 0.812*** 0.811*** 849.7*** 654.5*** 1022.2*** 1011.2*** 
 (0.0566) (0.0544) (160.1) (117.0) (96.54) (92.42) 
       
cvs==4500 0.767*** 0.769*** 380.7*** 196.3 566.8*** 565.4*** 
 (0.0577) (0.0569) (96.72) (115.9) (45.20) (43.83) 
       
cvs==5500 0.368*** 0.358*** 164.8 -43.52 183.8*** 165.9*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0627) (128.8) (97.52) (35.41) (28.59) 
       
cvs==6500 0.112*** 0.111*** 156.4 0 67.60*** 53.39** 
 (0.0328) (0.0317) (132.4) (0) (21.42) (24.53) 
       
cvs==7500 0 0 0 -143.5 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (154.3) (0) (0) 
       
round_id==2 0.1000** 0.106** -202.0** -191.1** -50.00 -37.56 
 (0.0392) (0.0368) (78.69) (88.22) (78.12) (81.33) 
       
round_id==3 0.0917** 0.0978** -132.6* -120.0 8.333 23.23 
 (0.0357) (0.0336) (67.49) (75.72) (59.43) (59.33) 
       
round_id==4 0.117* 0.111* -183.9** -187.8** -20.83 -24.50 
 (0.0555) (0.0565) (79.81) (84.88) (55.09) (51.26) 
       
round_id==5 0.139** 0.134** -151.0* -110.3 34.21 60.30 
 (0.0489) (0.0509) (83.56) (91.96) (56.72) (54.76) 
       
round_id==6 0.130** 0.130** -161.5 -138.1 16.88 27.78 
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 (0.0570) (0.0555) (112.0) (113.8) (69.89) (65.01) 
       
round_id==7 0.148*** 0.143*** -196.0** -164.1* 11.60 32.09 
 (0.0382) (0.0376) (80.81) (89.17) (55.34) (54.32) 
       
round_id==8 0.148*** 0.137** -179.4* -132.3 16.81 44.17 
 (0.0483) (0.0461) (86.99) (86.65) (57.96) (50.10) 
       
round_id==9 0.153*** 0.149*** -202.0** -187.2* 10.42 16.47 
 (0.0373) (0.0346) (94.15) (97.79) (71.87) (63.03) 
       
round_id==10 0.112** 0.101** -101.4 -71.35 54.68 64.11 
 (0.0447) (0.0418) (88.81) (83.11) (46.54) (40.98) 
       
buyer 0.167*** 0.157*** 190.2** 22.29 102.3*** 99.96*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0320) (76.48) (110.8) (16.04) (21.11) 
       
Age  -0.00103  -1.065  -1.672 
  (0.000619)  (1.434)  (1.176) 
       
School years  0.00256  15.93  12.45 
  (0.00197)  (12.66)  (8.726) 
       
Female  0.0320  -121.4**  -63.04* 
  (0.0239)  (46.29)  (32.15) 
       
Farm size  -0.0104*  -4.612  -13.47* 
  (0.00546)  (9.488)  (7.330) 
       
Trader  0.0126  25.26  44.04 
  (0.0167)  (46.38)  (34.42) 
       
High Status  0.0433**  -112.2*  -48.45 
  (0.0173)  (60.14)  (40.34) 
       
Constant 0.00000385 -0.0115 472.2*** 891.7*** 49.15 220.8** 
 (0.0502) (0.0536) (114.1) (175.1) (73.11) (99.77) 
Observations 2128 2042 1428 1370 2128 2042 
Number of 
Clusters 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
Inter = 
Middleman 
0.42 0.41 0.92 0.79 0.47 0.34 
Estimated using OLS. Even columns add trader controls. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
  
